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Under the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), certain
“health-care economic information” is permitted to be distrib-
uted by pharmaceutical manufacturers to deﬁned categories of
managed care decision makers [1]. The statute provides that
certain health-care economic information (HCEI) shall not be
considered false and misleading if it is based upon “competent
and reliable scientiﬁc evidence,” rather than the normal (and
higher) standard of “adequate and well-controlled trials” (also
known as substantial evidence). However, HCEI qualiﬁes for this
relaxed standard of proof under the statue only if the informa-
tion “directly relates to an indication approved under Section
505 [of the FD&C Act] or under Section 351(a) of the Public
Health Service Act . . .” [1].
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress was
willing to accept less restrictive treatment of HCEI only with
respect to approved indications [2]. This requirement provided
assurance that any efﬁcacy claims incorporated into HCEI would
already have been demonstrated through adequate and well-
controlled trials. FDAMA clearly does not permit a manufacturer
to promote an efﬁcacy claim that would otherwise be prohibited
through “gamesmanship”—that is weaving an unapproved claim
together with economic data and characterizing the mixture as
“health-care economic information.”
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) carefully limits a drug’s
labeling to the health claims proven by well-controlled studies. If
a particular drug is clinically shown to have a beneﬁcial effect only
on surrogatemarkers (e.g., blood pressure, cholesterol reduction),
the drug’s labeling is limited to claims about these surrogates, and
the applications of HCEI should align with the approved labeling
as well. The nature of the end points in approved labeling was an
important aspect of the congressional deliberations concerning
Section 114. One key issue related to the implementation of
Section 114 concerns the use of HCEI to characterize the value of
incremental effectiveness on a surrogate measure relative to the
incremental cost to achieve that value; HCEI metrics that align
with end points in approved labeling would appear to meet the
intent of the legislation. While the representation of relative value
concerning surrogate end points would probably meet the Section
114 criteria, it would be more limited and enable relative value
assessments only within the evidentiary boundaries of similar end
points supported with similar labeling. Relative value associated
with a speciﬁc end point might run counter to a quality-adjusted
life-year (QALY)-only policy that is intended to represent relative
value in the same currency across all interventions regardless of
end point. On the other hand, if an new drug application (NDA)
sponsor performed clinical studies demonstrating a beneﬁcial
impact on health outcome (HO) end points (e.g., reduction in
mortality and major morbidity) which were reﬂected in the drug’s
label, these could be reﬂected in QALY and life-year gained
metrics. Finally, allowing extrapolated HO claims to be incorpo-
rated intoHCEIwithout evidence of reduction inmajormorbidity
and mortality could dilute the incentive for manufacturers to
perform event-related end point studies.
Five examples of end points were provided in the House
Report on FDAMA to provide insights concerning the criteria
that HCEI be directly related to an approved indication [2]. The
examples illustrate the intent of Congress to align the evidence of
beneﬁt in an approved indication as an important part of the
generation of HCEI that is competent and reliable.
Quoting directly from the congressional record:
The proposal deﬁnes “health-care economic statement” as
any analysis that identiﬁed, measures, or compares the
economic consequences, including the costs of the repre-
sented health outcomes of the use of a drug to the use of
another drug, to another health-care intervention, or to no
intervention.
The provision is limited to analyses provided to such entities
because such entities are constituted to consider this type of
information through a deliberative process and are expected
to have the appropriate range of expertise to interpret health
care economic information presented to them to inform their
decision-making process, and to distinguish facts from
assumptions.
The provision is not intended to permit manufacturers to
provide such health care economic information to medical
practitioners who are making individual patient prescribing
decisions nor is it intended to permit the provision of such
information in the context of medical education.
To illustrate this point, economic claims based on preventing
disease progression would ordinarily not be considered to be
directly related to an approved indication for the treatment of
symptoms of a disease, for a drug for which the use in
prevention of disease progression has not been approved.
There were ﬁve clinical examples in the congressional record
(numbers and bold added):
1. For example, rheumatoid arthritis drugs are approved for
the treatment of symptoms and not for the prevention of
deformity. Therefore, economic claims based in part on an
assumption of prevention of deformity would not be con-
sidered directly related to the approved indications for
these drugs.
2. Similarly, economic claims based on prolonging patient sur-
vival would not be considered directly related and would
not, therefore, be permitted under this subsection, for
agents approved for the symptomatic treatment of heart
failure, but not approved for prolonging survival in heart
failure patients.
3. For example, modeling the resource savings of insulin
therapy to achieve tight control of blood sugar in type 1
diabetes could include cost savings associated with preven-
tion of retinopathy (an eye disease) and nephropathy
(kidney disease) based on well-controlled study(ies) that
demonstrate that control of blood sugar levels with insulin
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leads to a reduction of such consequences. Because pre-
vention of retinopathy and nephropathy could not simply
be assumed to be a result of blood sugar control, these
prevention claims would have to be shown by well-
controlled study(ies) before inclusion as health-care out-
come assumptions.
4. In contrast, economic claims that model, based on observa-
tional studies in a population of women, the economic
consequences of prevention of fractures due to osteoporosis
would be permitted for drugs already approved for preven-
tion of fractures due to osteoporosis. This is possible
because observational data may be considered competent
and reliable for making an assumption about the secondary
consequences of an osteoporotic fracture once the primary
prevention has been established.
5. Similarly, the long-term economic consequences of the pre-
vention of meningitis by haemophilus b inﬂuenza vaccine
could be modeled using population-based data once the
primary prevention claim is established.
These ﬁve clinical examples provide insights into the congres-
sional intent for Section 114 applications. One issue for the HO
community is the form that an HCEI analysis should take relative
to the substance of clinical evidence. The congress, with the
FDA’s input, felt that the clinical evidence should ground the
discussion of care choices, despite the fact that no formal guid-
ance concerning Section 114 has been issued to date. Many HO
interest groups appear less concerned with the clinical evidence,
the effectiveness denominator of the incremental cost effective-
ness ratio (ICER), and more concerned with the form—that the
denominator be a QALY and thus enable universal relative value
assessments.
When the FDA awards a claim for a drug, they have reason-
able conﬁdence that the claim is not false or misleading based
upon the evidence of effectiveness. Under 114 criteria, they are
not willing to allow surrogate-level evidence to be extrapolated
to event-level characterization of effectiveness. Two evidence
issues for the HO community are: 1) should the level of evidence
(i.e., surrogate or event) inﬂuence the choice of a HO metric; and
2) is a utility a valid and reliable means of adjusting for effec-
tiveness across end points that may represent surrogate or event-
level outcomes? A comparison of relative change based upon the
same surrogate in similar trial settings would appear to meet the
intent of the 114 legislation, while projecting risk reduction on
the basis of a change in a surrogate measure (e.g., blood pressure
or cholesterol) and comparing that measure of effectiveness to a
ﬁnding of risk reduction in an event trial (e.g., heart attacks,
strokes, and death) would appear to run counter the legislative
intent. Does the HO community have reasonable conﬁdence that
a QALY is not false or misleading? At an annual ISPOR meeting,
I attended a presentation where a QALY for an erectile dysfunc-
tion drug was compared to a QALY for a statin in the setting of
secondary prevention of heart disease events. While the QALYs
were roughly similar in amount, the effectiveness foundations
for relative value were very different with one relying primarily
on a relative change in a utility and the other on a relative
reduction in the composite rate of heart attacks, strokes, and
death. To promote competent and reliable comparisons, perhaps
it is time to give Section 114 another look.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this editorial are those of the author
alone and do not reﬂect the policies or practices of his employer.
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